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Urban Sprawl in Europe 
The alienated atmosphere, the shallow relationships of the residential suburbs inhabited 
by the American middle classes and the spatial manifestations of the failure of the 
American dream and family model are spectacularly presented in Edward Albee’s 
dramas written in the 1960s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, Everything in the Garden, 
or A Delicate Balance. The problems of some types of European, including French, 
suburbs such as suburban crime, violence or fear are best illustrated in the context of art 
cinema by films such as Mathieu Kassovitz’s La Haine (Hate) or Luc Besson’s Banlieue 
13 (District B13). 
Naturally, for us examples from the context of art are not as important as scientific 
studies indicating the main causes of today’s social problems, which are basically the 
lifestyle of the middle class, its self-fulfilling confinement and individualism in the 
American suburbs, and the concentrations of socially disadvantaged classes and social 
exclusion in Europe. Behind the differences, behind the characteristics of the American 
and European societies, and the traits of their history, economy and development, the 
different social structural features of cities are evident. The American middle classes live 
mostly in suburbs, and more disadvantaged groups are spatially concentrated in inner 
cities. The European middle classes are located predominantly in the inner city or better-
off suburban areas, while the disadvantaged classes are increasingly concentrated in 
suburban areas. 
Although European suburbs are different from their American counterparts, there are 
visible signs of increasing convergence. Now European cities also have to face tensions 
which hitherto characterised mainly American urban societies. European cities are also 
typified by fragmentation, the rise of individualism, and the disintegration of community 
sense and social cohesion (Cattan p. 1). Slums, which in the past were mainly typical of 
American cities, are now spreading in European cities as well and segregation is also 
increasing (Haussermann–Haila 2010, p. 60). The hereto positive features specific to 
Europe, namely the European welfare state which has played an outstanding role in 
comparison with America, the relatively limited enforcement of market impacts and 
public efforts to manage social tensions, have been damaged and needs to be limited 
(Kazepov 2010, Cities of Europe). It is a fact that the European welfare states are not 
always able to restrain the various tensions, particularly due to different social structural 
and economic difficulties and crises, and to the strengthening of European urban sprawl 
and its sociological impacts. Besides American suburbanisation, which fundamentally 
has historical relevance to America, European suburbanisation is also gradually 
spreading (Kazepov 2010, p. 13). Because of global economic interests, metropolitan 
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areas are functionally transforming; the significance of the role of central business 
districts, so prominent in the United States, is growing in European inner cities. As a 
result there is an increasing ‘tendency to shift consumption from the CBD to suburban 
shopping malls’ (Haussermann–Haila 2010, p. 61). 
Urban sprawl is strongly criticised in international literature, including the case 
studies of this book. Criticisms highlight the problems of urbanised but uncontrollably 
expanding areas, the decline of rural areas, the decreasing territory of agricultural areas 
and forests, and the depletion of green spaces (Görgl et al. 2011, Cattan 2011). Nearly all 
the criticisms point out the environmental threats of powerful motorisation, the effects on 
health of time-consuming commuting between home and work, the radical lifestyle shift 
related to residence change, and the negative consequences of car-dependent suburban 
lifestyle (Frumkin 2002, Reeh–Zerlag 2011, p. 14). 
The issues of adverse economic effects and the costs of meeting the development 
needs of infrastructural investments, including road network development which slows 
the dynamism of the economy, are also raised (Williamson–Imbroscio–Alperovitz 2005). 
Concerns include citizens escaping to suburban zones due to environmental hazards and 
the visible signs of poverty in inner cities, the radically decreasing urban population and 
the disappearance of traditional compact cities (Munoz 2003). 
The new structural characteristics of urban-regional societies transforming in sprawl, 
the segregation of residential communities populated by the upper and middle classes 
together with their negative urban effects (Le Goix 2004), and peri-urban/social 
exclusion are strongly criticised. According to the French study in this book, urban 
sprawl is perceived in France and other parts of Europe as the end of the social model, 
supporting a trend which may impair the integration of sections of society. Urban sprawl 
here appears to replicate all the faults of the models, concerning North American cities, 
that is to say increasing individualism, strengthening social segregation and the increased 
use of motor vehicles among other things (Cattan 2011, p. 11). 
In Europe, instead of or in addition to the urban-rural conflict, problems are caused by 
the formation of a new kind of spatial social dichotomy, the disparities between the core 
and the periphery, the city and its urban neighbourhood (Vieillard-Baron 2008). The most 
extreme examples of social exclusion are generated by the incredible scale of urban 
growth in Third World countries, which is totally uncontrolled. In Africa, South America, 
Brazil, India and even China the poorest of the poor live on the edge of cities in 
peripheral slums under inhuman circumstances (Davis 2007). 
Not everyone opposes urban growth, mainly because they acknowledge the social 
demand for a suburban environment, namely that more and more people prefer suburban 
zones when choosing a place of residence. Many people also believe that urban sprawl is 
a development tool of urban neighbourhood which enables the urbanisation of rural areas 
(Fishman 1990, Le-Goaziou–Rojzman 2006, p. 10). 
The supporters of both viewpoints offer solutions to the problems. The opponents 
recommend the strengthening of centralised urban planning models, developments in 
inner city areas, and higher and denser buildings. The supporters of urban sprawl urge the 
dynamic development of public transport and powerful planning interventions. 
Neither the arguments nor the proposed solutions are new. Of the numerous historical 
examples, perhaps Howard’s concept of the garden city, the planning intervention of the 
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19th century, is the most significant, which many people believe is still valid. Garden 
cities built around but separated from major cities – as compact settlements – offer work 
and living space with full leisure facilities, and fully integrate the inhabitants, absorbing 
people wishing to live in big cities, thus preventing the unlimited growth of town centres 
(Howard 1902). In contrast, the so-called ‘Good City’ idea offered a solution for a 
capitalist town of the 19th century, especially for problems faced by workers 
(Haussermann–Haila 2010, p. 54), although in effect it envisaged a more middle-class 
(Kesteloot 2010, p. 126) than working-class suburban model of development. As regards 
the latter, the Paris suburban pavillonaires model built for workers proved to be more 
successful1 (Haumont 2005). 
Another example are the groups of avant-garde Russian architects in the 1920s and 
1930s, the urbanists and deurbanists, who represented two different concepts, and their 
proposals for influencing urban sprawl. The supporters of the first group envisioned a 
model of concentrated urban development, while the other group planned to alleviate the 
perceivable urban problems by a decentralised, dispersed urban development model 
(Kopp 1979). 
Although the suburbs born in the spirit of the garden city idea in several European 
cities tried to prevent the excessive expansion of the population by diverting the 
settlement of the population in specific directions, they were never really successful. The 
relevance of the garden city idea and the realisation of plans, i.e. the formation and long-
term sustainability of communities propagating the unity of home and work in Europe, 
were supplanted in the meantime by processes transforming the economy: the 
development of the urban service sector attracting masses of people, which was not yet 
very noticeable in the early 1900s but later became dynamic, and the changing demands 
and forms of lifestyle as well as the weakening of local character, the trends of 
globalisation (Castells 1972, Merlin 1972, p. 62). The ideas of ‘Fingerplan’ in 1945 
presented in the Danish case study, the positive effects elaborated and expected at that 
time on the unity of economic and social welfare, and the ambitions of the plan built on 
the aspects of reasonability and careful planning were questioned by these processes as 
well (Reeh–Zerlang 2011, p. 13). 
Since then, the problems raised by Howard or even the avant-garde architects and 
their proposed solutions, and the processes of urbanisation and their impacts have 
changed radically because of the acceleration of the processes of globalisation and, as 
Enyedi suggests in his recent study, the enforcement of the new phase of urbanisation 
(Enyedi 2011). Originally the concepts attempted to respond to the problems of the first 
stages of urbanisation at that time, addressing the problems of urban growth, the 
accelerated flow to cities and the emergent problems of suburbanisation. Of course, the 
spatial problems of the early periods were also severe but differed from those of the 
present process and the effects of the advance of globalisation, behind which there are 
great mechanisms that today seem to be scientific banalities. One the one hand, in the 
developed Western European countries (and the United States and Japan) a strong 
economic and social centralisation of the service sector can be observed: the metropolitan 
 
1 In the 1970s 70,000 state-subsidised, private family houses were built in the outskirts of Paris for families with modest 
means by usinga uniform house manufacturing technology and architectural style. 
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concentration of the service sector and skilled labour, the advance of multinational and 
transnational corporations, and as a result the strong development of large cities and their 
periphery (Veltz 1996, p. 33). On the other hand, the central role of the metropolitan 
regions in the world economy is evident, as is their aspiration for power for these 
reasons. The increasing concentration of the economy and population was seen in the 
growing territorial division of homes and workplaces and the fact that homes expanded 
outwards faster than workplaces. This determined the spatial movement of capital 
investment from the centre outwards, infrastructure development projects, and the 
establishment of trade and other services (Hall 1996). The result is the space-consuming 
expansion of urban agglomerations, the increased level of short- and long-term 
commuting, growing demand for transport and greater capacity, rising environmental 
damage, the transformation of spatial and social structure, i.e. urban sprawl, and its 
effects. Several factors lie behind the contemporary space consumption phenomena of 
metropolitan areas, including the expansion of the values of consumer society, the 
steadily increasing number of people living well and the changed residential demands. In 
addition the world system of power provides a regional development system which 
pushes social aspects into the background and enforces economic interests. The Danish 
case study shows that the global transformation, the evolving urban network systems 
between contemporary modern cities, and the goals of the project-oriented political 
intervention caused ‘the shift from the welfare city to the growth city’ (Reeh–Zerlang 
2011, p. 13). 
The evolution of urban sprawl correlates with the characteristic features of the roles 
of states in regional development and with the system of state subsidisation. In the United 
States of America, suburban development was initiated by the New Deal, the 
government’s new economic, social and credit policy introduced in the 1930s, which was 
boosted by housing subsidies and long-term, 20-to-25-year loans in the 1950s. The 
marketing of suburban lifestyle promoting the ideal new American way of life also 
influenced the process as it met the demands of the middle classes tired of metropolitan 
life by offering a new way of living with the promise of less noise, less traffic and less 
crime. It even suggested that local community cohesion would afford protection from the 
poor (Williamson–Imbroscio–Alperovitz 2005). In the United States the importance of 
state initiatives has now decreased considerably; in addition to various government 
incentives and support systems, market actors have an increasing influence on regional 
trends.2 
The case studies presented in this book show that, even though strong state 
intervention and modest market intervention was typical in Europe historically, this 
situation has now changed, and the convergence is becoming more visible; the role of the 
state has decreased and that of market actors has increased. This was partly because of 
the crisis of the welfare states and partly because of the increasing need of local 
governments to involve the market actors in planning thanks to the support of local 
 
2 The role of civil society actors is also increasing. A number of initiatives have been launched not to support urban sprawl 
but to stop it, for example the New Urbanism movement or the preparation of Smart Growth guidelines aimed at building 
viable, multi-functional, compact settlements. 
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residential civil society and especially to the pressure of local and global economic lobby 
groups.  
The case study of the Danish capital presented in this book shows how the state 
consciously managed the development of the Greater Copenhagen Region and the 
decentralisation processes, including moving the middle classes out of the city, by the 
construction of rented family homes and by creating the necessary transport and other 
infrastructure. However, planning possibilities were limited, if not supplanted, by 
urbanisation, globalisation mechanisms and the global interests of the market. An urban 
neighbourhood has developed as a result of state-backed bank loans, and the co-operation 
of the national and local authorities, and private land developers and investors (Zerlag–
Reeh 2011). 
In the case of the Paris Region the management of development processes was also a 
conscious public policy goal, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Among them, the new 
urban development programme defined the directions of peri-urban development by 
designating the location of new towns as well as the main target areas for the 
accommodation of the middle classes (dissatisfied with housing estates) in the suburbs, 
which had outstanding significance (Szirmai 1991, Haumont et al. 1999). The French 
case study highlights the continuing importance of state intervention. As a result of an act 
passed in 2000, the population of Paris, which had been decreasing for a long time, began 
to grow again. The evolution of peri-urban areas today is mainly regulated by market 
forces and bank loans based on social and residential needs. As regards the latter, the 
high property prices in Paris are of particular importance. An increasing number of low 
social status and younger, career starter intellectual groups seek to buy cheaper land 
around the city (Cattan 2011).  
The Austrian case study also shows that, although market forces are important, the 
intervention efforts of the state or even regional-level authorities are still not negligible. 
By using various planning tools, monitoring the processes and employing new 
development strategies reflecting today’s conditions, these endeavours seek to mitigate 
the adverse effects of suburbanisation patterns (Görgl et al. 2011). 
The growth of the suburban zone of Budapest in the socialist system was naturally 
different from the above phenomena. However, the benefit of hindsight reveals 
similarities, albeit historically belated. Let us see why. 
In Hungary, including Budapest, especially in the first phase of the state socialist 
system, spatial processes were fully regulated by the intervention of the state and 
followed its political and ideological interests. There were no market mechanisms 
(following the economic reform in 1968 they operated only in a limited and controlled 
manner3), and consequently there was neither private capital nor private property or land; 
the means of production and companies were all state-owned. There were no market 
actors and there were no local governments in a real sense. In the so-called council 
 
3 The so-called new economic mechanism was introduced in Hungary on 1 January 1968. In order to renew the half-
depleted economy, to accelerate growth and to strengthen social welfare, three key reforms were introduced by the government: 
the central planning role of the state decreased and corporate self-reliance increased; prices were liberalised, i.e. in addition to 
officially fixed prices the prices of some products were defined in accordance with market demand, and finally the centrally 
determined wage system was replaced by a more flexible one, within certain limits set by corporate control. These reforms were 
unique in the countries of the socialist bloc.  
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system ‘local’ powers had neither legal nor financial or socially legitimate (political) 
means to manage their regional processes. Due to the characteristic features of the 
system, right up until the change of the political system in 1990, the growth of the peri-
urban population could not be described as suburbanisation. It was rather the peri-urban 
concentration of the unemployed rural agricultural population excluded from the 
mechanisms of the system, especially from the economic and other benefits of regional 
development. These people flocked to urban areas, particularly around the capital city, in 
search of job opportunities. This involved mass commuting (mainly public transport and 
workers’ bus services), which consequently caused serious pollution. However, due to 
the interpretation of environmental policy at that time, this did not generate social 
problems4. 
In order to prevent the expansion of large cities, partly because of the hostility 
towards Budapest in particular and big cities in general, state-initiated new town 
development concepts also prevailed. Unlike the Western European model, these 
developments (one of them in the Budapest region) were mainly ideological goals, 
representing working class interests. However, in fact they provided a chance to exploit 
the raw materials necessary for accelerating the development of heavy industry. At the 
same time, through their attractivity they also contributed to the disintegration of the old 
urban bourgeois society (Szirmai 1991, 1998). The regional development control of new 
towns until the regime change can be considered successful. The population of such 
towns steadily increased until 1990. This means that they were able to absorb the 
immigrating rural population due to the continuous substantial public and private house 
constructions. Behind the dynamics of flat constructions it is also apparent that, despite 
the looming crisis, local large companies (including workplaces), which were also in a 
dire predicament, received significant support from the local government in order to 
prevent the outbreak of social conflicts. 
The failure of the state socialist regional development policy was not caused by the 
rise of market forces, but rather by the consequences of the crises of the regime which 
became harder and harder to conceal (the foreign debt of the state, the absence of large 
companies, the uncertain market conditions, the consequences of the shortage economy). 
In addition, in large cities with county rank, in particular Budapest, local land 
development needed autonomy. These were the consequences of the so-called softness of 
the Hungarian political system, the results of the economic opportunities offered by the 
Hungarian model. In 1968, the introduction of the so-called new economic mechanism, 
the state-controlled quasi-market conditions, and the appearance of the second economy 
reinforced local forces, especially cities with county rank and Budapest. These became 
 
4 The state socialist centralised social governance and political power structure eliminated environmental factors and all 
the social forces that were interested in protecting the environment. The socialist planned economy did not consider 
environment as an internal element of the economy. Therefore economic development concepts did not take ecological 
consequences into account and did not attribute objective value to natural resources. Thus the centralised economic 
management model operating without market and price mechanisms utilised natural elements free of charge and did not 
consider the consequent social costs. In this way it could more easily enforce its non-economic power, military and other 
interests, and it could better conceal the performance limits of the economic system as well as the problems of efficiency. 
Society was ignorant of both damage to the environment and its adverse effects on health. Social conflicts arising from 
environmental damages emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s (Szirmai 1993, 1996). 
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redistributive centres as well as regional, settlement development and resource 
distribution centres able to assert their own interests. 
In the political and social transformation of the 1990s, the state further withdrew from 
the development of regional processes due to the legacy of the socialist period, the crisis 
that emerged and a lack of capital. The new local governments were given greater 
powers. By virtue of the new Local Government Act of 1990, local authorities became 
responsible for town planning, development and decisions related to land use. The new 
local authorities, funded by locally generated revenue, shared taxes and the central 
government’s normative contribution, were self-managing. However, the difficulties 
arising in the development of a market economy and the deficits of the State Treasury 
saw the emergence of re-centralisation tendencies already in the 1990s. Not only the re-
centralisation of development resources, but also the lack of local capital resources 
restricted the planning and development opportunities of local governments. As a result, 
local development decisions were reached to serve land owners’ and real estate 
developers’ interests throughout the whole country, including Budapest. This was partly 
because of the underfunding of local authorities and partly because of the interest in 
realising additional revenues from land sales and the re-classification of territories. Urban 
policy-makers in Budapest fully ceded the development formation and investment 
opportunities to market forces and economic lobbies interested in the development of the 
city’s outer urban neighbourhood. It should be noted that not only large urban centres but 
also peri-urban areas attracted foreign direct investments and various developments 
during the change of the Hungarian political system. 
Among urban citizens who were discontented with urban rehabilitation projects in 
central Budapest implemented in isolation due to signs of crisis in the inner city area 
(traffic anomalies, pollution, the increasingly visible signs of urban poverty), the long-
suppressed unsatisfied needs for suburban individual residential houses gradually 
intensified. This was in part because of the contemporary housing policy and the 
characteristic features of the housing market. Their needs boosted the demand for moving 
out of cities and gave rise to suburbanisation processes. 
Almost all the professional groups concerned and relevant professional documents 
warned of the foreseeable adverse consequences of the unrestrained territorial expansion. 
Nevertheless, no regulations with a powerful set of tools were made with the intention of 
controlling or the ability to influence this ‘spontaneous’ process. The suburban 
development policy of Budapest was clearly contradictory. These contradictions are also 
explained by the fact that, although ideas of limiting expansion appeared in plans at the 
level of the capital city (as well as state or regional level), the provision of resources and 
the assignment of legal and incentive instruments essentially failed. 
The regional development policies and programmes approved in this period not only 
showed the lack of adequate state regulation but also demonstrated that there were no 
incentive mechanisms to encourage efficient land use. The regional level development 
approach did not develop either. This process resulted in the unstructured and 
uncoordinated land use practice that developed in the Budapest agglomeration area 
(especially in its outskirts) which was characterised by the uncontrolled expansion of 
urban areas, along with the deterioration of territorial potentials and by the oversupply of 
potential development areas. 
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Public housing and credit policies did not assign development priorities either. They 
could not significantly influence suburban development in which private equity 
established in part as a result of land and housing privatisation, the site-selection strategy 
of global companies and new demands for moving into the suburban zone were 
dominant. 
The legislation that restricted the unlimited expansion of new ‘areas to be built in’ 
was delayed by more than a decade. In 2005 Parliament passed the Act on Spatial 
Planning in the Agglomeration of Budapest (Act LXIV of 2005), which, intending to 
coordinate regional land use, set the possibility of further increasing the ratio of built-in 
areas in the administrative area of municipalities at 3%. However, these overdue 
restrictions were ineffective because the local authorities concerned reclassified large 
areas either before the legal limitation or on hearing the news of its possibility, and in 
these areas developments and investments started later at random.5 
The amendment of LXIV Act of 2005 on Spatial Planning in the Agglomeration of 
Budapest6 further tightened the eligibility for including new areas and reduced the 
possibility of development to 2%. The amendment contains several new elements 
encouraging local authorities in the region to take greater care of the landscape, and 
natural and cultural values, and urging more thoughtful and efficient land management. 
However, because the Act does not revoke the previous ill-considered local decisions, its 
efficiency – and impact on real processes – would only be appropriate if the instruments 
of land use control were extended by development, support and incentive elements which 
served sustainable land management purposes and at the same time redefined interest 
relations. 
The state, including the capital city’s official actors, essentially ceded the suburban 
residential (including condominium) and other economic development-related areas to 
market players on the one hand, and on the other hand to the middle classes who were 
unsatisfied with the city centre and wanted to move out, and to the lower classes forced 
to leave the large city due to gradual impoverishment. In this way the capital city’s social 
problems and certain tensions of urban poverty were relocated to the outskirts (forming 
the subject of our research) and less developed parts of the city. 
Unlike the French case, social problems concentrated in the surrounding zone of 
Budapest are more the cumulative tensions of residential disadvantage and social 
backwardness, thus they are rather the problems of poverty7 and not of immigration. 
Spatial conflicts arising from the immigration of foreigners in Hungary are not or hardly 
visible, which is partly due to the lower ratio of foreign immigrants in comparison to 
Europe (6.5% of the EU population are foreigners, while the Hungarian average is 2.0% 
 
5 The size of reserve areas can be characterised by the fact that on the basis of land use surveys carried out in 2010 the 
total size of ‘unused’ areas designated for residential and municipal purposes in local land use plans was 6,740 hectares, which 
is 9.2% of the total area designated for this purpose. Of the area designated for economic use (7,450 hectares), about one third 
(35%) of the area designated for this purpose was still ‘unused’. According to the investigations of PESTTERV Kft., of the 
municipal area of land designated, 15%, a total of about 14,000 hectares, was regarded as territorial reserves during this period 
(Schuchmann, 2011). 
6 See Act LXXXVIII of 2011 on the amendment of Act LXIV of 2005 on Spatial Planning in the Agglomeration of 
Budapest. 
7 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that regional poverty is more prevalent in eastern Hungary, especially in 
rural areas and to a lesser extent in urban areas, and it is less of a regional phenomenon in Budapest. 
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(Vasileva, 2011)). The study on gentrification indicates a ratio of 5% in Budapest, but 
this is partly because segregated zones of immigrants have not been established in the 
Hungarian capital region as they have in Vienna or even Copenhagen. 
Suburbanisation and gentrification 
The social aspects related to the process of urbanisation are the expression of Fordist 
economic development, and of the spatial needs and interests of the resultant consumer 
society; the well-off and expanding middle class wanting to live in family-owned houses 
with a garden in a clean natural environment. 
In the 1950s in the United States 35 million people, nearly a quarter of the population, 
were suburban residents. This ratio was over 30% at the end of the decade (Hobbes–
Stoops 20028) and in the 1970s and 1980s this figure continued to increase. Statistics 
show that this trend has continued and today about half of American society lives in 
suburbs. 
The ratio of urban population further decreased and the ratio of peri-urban population 
continued to grow in big American metropolises between 1990 and 2000 (from 46% to 
50%). Suburban population ratios are much higher than the rates of urban population and 
the vast majority of the population of urbanised regions lives in suburbs (See Table 1). 
Table 1 
USA – Change in the rate of urban and suburban population in 1990 and 2000 
(Per cent) 
1990 2000 
Metropolitan region 
urban rate  suburban rate urban rate suburban rate 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island 37 63 38 62 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County 24 76 23 77 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha 34 66 32 68 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria 44 56 42 58 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City 27 73 25 75 
San Diego 45 55 43 57 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint 20 80 17 83 
Dallas-Fort Worth 36 64 33 67 
Phoenix-Mesa 44 56 41 59 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island 71 29 72 28 
Source: Based on http://www.demographia.com/db-2000metrocoreshare.htm and http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Smith. 
Urban. Decline.doc, edited by the authors. 
However, trends in Europe are different. In major European metropolises the ratio of 
urban population in many cases is well above suburban population ratios. (This is 
particularly true of the capitals of former socialist countries like Prague, Warsaw and 
Budapest, but also of other capitals such as Berlin, Vienna, Brussels, London and Rome.) 
There are exceptions, such as Copenhagen and especially Paris, where the proportion of 
the suburban population is much higher. 
 
8 http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf 
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In the last few years there have been spectacular changes in the share of the 
population of the metropolitan regions of several European cities. For example, the 
proportion of the suburban population rose by a few per cent in Madrid, Berlin, Rome, 
Vienna, Warsaw, Prague and Ljubljana between 1996 and 2004. The biggest increase 
took place around Budapest (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
European Union – Change in the rate of urban and suburban population  
in 1996 and 2004 
(Per cent) 
1996 2004 
Metropolitan region 
urban rate suburban rate urban rate suburban rate 
London 61 39 62 38 
Parisa) 19 81 19 81 
Brussels 55 45 56 44 
Copenhagen 27 73 28 72 
Madrid 56 44 53 47 
Berlin 70 30 68 32 
Romea) 75 25 74 26 
Vienna 75 25 73 27 
Warsaw 65 35 64 36 
Prague 62 38 60 40 
Ljubljana 55 45 54 46 
Budapest 76 24 71 29 
Stockholm 45 55 41 59 
Dublin 35 65 30 70 
Bratislava 73 27 71 29 
Tallinn 77 23 75 25 
Riga 76 24 73 27 
Vilnius 79 21 78 22 
Helsinki 47 53 46 54 
Sofiab) 96 4 86 14 
Athens 20 80 20 80 
Lisbon 27 73 22 78 
Bucharest 91 9 90 10 
a) Data of the 2001 Urban Audit.  
b) Data of the 1991 and 2001 Urban Audit. 
After peri-urban population growth following suburbanisation (i.e. the formation of 
the first suburbs, the settlements close to the urban centre) and later peri-urbanisation (i.e. 
the formation of settlement rings located further away), a new trend can be seen in almost 
all the big European cities of our study. For example, in Vienna, particularly in some 
inner city districts, the phenomenon of re-urbanisation has emerged in the last few years 
(Fasmann 2004, Görgl et al. 2011, p. 10). The 2007 statistics for Budapest show that the 
outflow from the capital also seems to have slackened and the population in the city has 
started to grow (Schuchmann 2011; Szirmai, et al. 2011). The Paris case study also 
reveals that ‘the last ten years have shown a reversal in the trend. The return to the city 
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centre has been particularly noticeable, demonstrated by an increase of 3% in the 
population of Paris and of 6% in its inner core’ (Cattan 2011, p. 5). 
However, the sources of population growth are often uncertain. In Budapest, for 
example, the absence of recent statistical data makes it very difficult to judge whether the 
reason for the increase is moving back from the urban neighbourhood or the 
concentration of population in metropolitan areas, which is experienced nationwide.  
As regards Vienna, the explanation is clear as ‘the population growth is generally 
based exclusively on migration processes … the growth is the result of immigration’ 
(Görgl et al. 2011, p. 10).  
In any case, it can be stated that urban population growth is obviously generated by 
gentrification processes as well. In European cities, including those we analysed and 
presented, these are increasingly characterised by burgeoning suburbanisation processes, 
which occur either in parallel or subsequently. In Kesteloot’s opinion this is because ‘the 
socio-spatial history of European cities has been characterised by tension between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces that, for the sake of simplicity, can be termed 
suburbanisation and gentrification’ (Kesteloot 2010, p. 126). Essentially the same 
mechanisms are at work behind the process which formulates urban sprawl as well and thus 
the declining role of the state and the rise of market forces. However, these are not the 
aspects of groups interested in urban sprawl but of groups interested in urban renewal. 
Franz points out this process in the presentation of the gentrification process in Vienna: 
‘The Austrian welfare state system has changed over recent years, and now tendencies that 
are much more market-driven are being observed both in Vienna and elsewhere’ (Franz 
2011, p. 2). The factors originating from the rejection of suburban lifestyle, and from the 
reorganisation of cultural and consumer demands also form part of the dynamics. The study 
on Hungarian gentrification remarks that the better educated middle class consumers have 
demands that cannot be satisfied by the ordinary hypermarkets of the suburbs but only in 
the inner city (Csanádi, Csizmady and Olt 2011, p. 4). 
The renaissance of historic city centres is taking place in a highly differentiated 
manner from country to country. The literature on this topic shows that the differences 
between European and North American cities are particularly significant. The renovation 
of the inner districts is fostered by various social groups and not just yuppies. Instances 
of this are global city centres such as New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen 1991). 
Different groups renew the inner districts using various intervention tools, which creates 
a differentiated built environment with different consumer opportunities and different 
social content (van Criekingen 2003, p. 96). 
The urban renewal examples of Vienna and Budapest, which are described in the 
book, demonstrate local characteristics which originate from the historical conditions of 
urban development and from the belated nature of urban development in Hungary. The 
Austrian study deals with the post-renovation conditions, the purified phenomena of the 
physical and social fabrics, while the Hungarian case study records the trends of 
transformation and the currently emerging processes, and also demonstrates the rules of 
convergence. The expansion of the competitiveness of the two cities after a complete 
renovation and the rather segregated phenomena of the social composition of the 
residential neighbourhood are the reasons why the authors investigating the renewal of 
city centres, view the phenomenon of gentrification as a more positive process than the 
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heavy outflow scenario, which strengthens social segregation as higher social classes 
move out from the city centre to suburban gated communities, leaving the poor behind. 
The evaluation of the segregation effects of gentrification and suburbanisation is far 
from clear-cut: there is much research to show that urban renewal is not only followed by 
the continued residence or return flow of the higher social classes but also causes real 
estate prices to rise, displacing the poorer social groups from inner parts mostly to low-
status suburbs or peri-urban settlements. 
For example, real estate prices in the inner districts of Paris increased dramatically, 
tripling in the ten years after 2000. By the end of this period housing prices reached an 
average of 7,000 euro per square metre in ‘Beaux Quartiers’, that is the best 
neighbourhoods (Bronner, 2010, p. 9). This reinforces the existing socio-spatial 
hierarchy: binding the middle classes to metropolises, increasing the outward movement 
of poorer, lower social status groups (not just the uneducated, but rather people with a 
lower income), including school leavers and lower-middle class families, and 
accelerating the exclusion affecting the poor classes. 
Suburban societies 
The theatre and film examples mentioned briefly at the beginning of the study drew 
attention to two different suburban social formations. Both are types of mostly middle-
class suburban societies, one with a lower and the other with a higher social status. Of 
course, these two types do not cover the spatial-social polarisation of the metropolitan 
societies of our time, which is much more differentiated today. For example, in 
Fassmann’s and Hatz’s opinion the city of Vienna ‘is characterised by three separate 
social milieus, which are segregated from each other … The first sector is the city of the 
rich and educated, who benefit from the globalised economy … the second city refers to 
the city of the marginalised groups, consisting of the unemployed, an underclass dealing 
with multiple social problems like poverty, homelessness and drug abuse, and, finally, 
specific groups of immigrants … Last but not least, the third city has to be mentioned, the 
“normal” city providing work, supplies and housing. Its population consists of “ordinary” 
people, neither particularly affluent and well-educated nor extremely poor or 
marginalised. It is the city of the middle class … it comprises the “working-class” 
districts of the city itself’ (Fassmann–Hatz 2007, pp. 75–76). 
The problems of disadvantaged suburbs are topical due to the increasingly polarised 
urban areas and the concentrations of social tensions. In French society in recent years 
special political and scientific attention has been paid to this kind of urban problem. The 
reasons for this include the excessively high peri-urban population rate and the brutal 
2005 Paris suburban riots and demonstrations, as well as the fact that the majority of 
French people regard the suburbs, including the suburban housing estates, as 
embodiments of social deviance9 (Vieillard-Baron 2008). 
 
9 According to French researchers, the influence of the media is particularly important in the development of a negative 
image, but it is also true that some professional groups such as architects, researchers and politicians have given the public an 
unfavourable or rather one-sided picture firstly of residential areas and then of suburbs. 
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The starting point of the housing-related social stigma was the so-called ‘Sarcessism’, 
i.e. the criticisms related to Sarcesses–Lochére, a new quarter built 15 kilometres from 
Paris in the 1960s, which over-emphasised isolation, the gigantic dull built environment 
and urban crime, which concentrated there. Contemporary studies, however, suggest that 
a significant part of the population in housing estates proved to be pleased with their 
place of residence, except where crime was significant (Vieillard-Baron, 2008, p. 28). 
Meanwhile actual ongoing processes also explained the negative attitude towards housing 
estates (Le-Goaziou–Rojzman 2006, p. 36). Discontent mainly among the middle class 
had been caused by post-war housing shortages and then the housing estates built as a 
response to the needs of the demographic explosion, the baby boom, because the 
necessary residential infrastructure was poorly provided and the monotonous built 
environment was disliked. For this reason higher-status social classes started to leave the 
new quarters in the 1970s and 1980s and moved back to urban centres that had been 
renovated in the meanwhile, neighbouring villages in a better ecological and social 
position, better suburban areas or new cities. From the mid 1960s an increasing number 
of foreign immigrants moved into housing estates, in part at the behest of the authorities 
and in part from the ‘bidonville’, that is the slums, created spontaneously by North and 
West African immigrants. 
In the 1960s large companies (especially car factories) built suburban districts in Paris 
in part for French employees, but mostly for foreign immigrant, unskilled, uneducated 
workers arriving from North Africa, especially Algeria (Le Goaziou–Rojzman 2006, p. 
21). Now the second and third generations of former migrants live there who, similarly to 
the first generation, are unskilled, uneducated and mostly unemployed. 
About 5 million people in France live in the so-called ‘Sensitive Urban Areas’ (Zones 
Urbaines Sensibles, ZUS), in socially problematic peri-urban areas. The proportion of 
migrants concentrated in these areas is above average, nearly twice the average for French 
cities. Almost 40% of the residents of the sensitive areas did not complete their schooling 
and they account for a significant part of the unemployed today. In 2009 the unemployment 
rate there was nearly 18.6%, double the national average of 9.5%. They are mostly young 
people, mainly men (Le Goaziou, Rojzman 2006, p. 24, Bronner 2010, p. 9). 
The uncertainties of the future, the problems of everyday living and residential social 
tensions are the sources of a number of specific conflicts. There are conflicts between the 
older and younger generations, which stem from the older generation’s fear of the rowdy 
gangs of young people ‘living’ in the streets. (To illustrate that this phenomenon is 
general and not exclusively French, it is worth mentioning the 2009 British film Harry 
Brown directed by Daniel Barber. In this rather shocking thriller youth gangs terrorise the 
mostly retired residents of run-down housing estates on the outskirts of London.) 
Confrontations, sometimes quiet but sometimes loud, develop between the active and the 
unemployed, which often escalate into ethnic problems. The residential conflicts are 
essentially of a social, structural nature, sometimes between the immigrants or their 
descendants and the ‘indigenous’ French, but more often between minority suburban 
lower middle classes, middle classes and the majority underclass, the excluded. 
Almost all the case studies presented here describe the problems of higher status, 
mostly middle-class suburbs. This kind of suburban model in Europe and North America 
was created as a result of different housing policy support schemes mostly for the 
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middle-class and in many cases the upper-middle-class population (Jaumain–Lemarchand 
2008). The developments intended to take into account the requirements of metropolitan 
expansion, the crisis of urban centres, the functional transformation of the 
suburbanisation of the middle class, including their aspirations for differentiation, car 
traffic and the needs of a family-based lifestyle (Harter 2008). This model is a result of 
social and structural inequalities, and the spatial separation of the upper and the lower 
social classes. In America, the model was shaped by ethnic contents as well due to the 
contradictions between the white upper and upper-middle class populated suburbs, the 
American ‘mainstream’, and the low social status (mostly inner) urban districts inhabited 
by problematic, often dark-skinned Americans, the so-called ‘others’ (Imbroscio, 
Williamson, Alperovitz 2005, p. 318).  
The suburbs of the Budapest region can be divided into two types, which by using the 
case study, the statistical analyses and other empirical methods can also be defined as 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ peri-urban settlements. This division is based on 
social structural characteristics and other factors, such as infrastructure, housing and 
institutional coverage. The two types clearly differ in terms of the composition of local 
societies and the people moving in, the characteristic features of employment and 
commuting, and the economic processes of settlements. People moving to advanced 
villages are mainly members of higher status social groups (secondary and tertiary 
graduates, knowledge workers with high incomes), while underdeveloped rural areas 
typically attract newcomers who are blue-collar workers on low incomes with primary 
school education.  
Ageing is one of the current problems of high status suburbs, which is not only a 
European but also a global phenomenon. This is proved, among other things, by a 
Canadian/French comparative analysis. In Canada in the 1950s and 1960s, and in France 
in the 1970s mainly young people, who were on average 25 years old and had a family, 
moved to suburban areas. They were the baby boomers, the generation of people who 
mostly entered the housing market around 1970 (Gill 2008, Luxembourg 2008). This 
group included people who no longer wanted to live with their parents, wished for their 
own home and desired to be independent.  
However, the first half of the 2000s brought significant changes. By 2006 the baby 
boomers, typically graduates with high incomes, entered their sixties. In the meantime 
their children had left home and moved back to the city centres, partly due to the renewal 
of inner cities. This radically transformed the structure of the suburban households, 
significantly reducing the proportion of parents living together with children and 
increasing the ratio of single or single-parent households, which in part was caused by 
divorce. As a result of gentrification, the social structure also changed. For example, two 
thirds of active graduates, especially women aged between 25 and 54 years living alone 
in the Montréal metropolitan region, chose an urban form of life, living in the city as the 
urban environment was better suited to their contemporary lifestyle (Gill 2008, p. 61). 
This is also the reason why the author of the Canadian case study asks how suburbs 
which were built mainly for the family life of the highly skilled middle classes with high 
incomes will be sustainable. The newly arrived young families have lower incomes and 
are less able to afford the suburban housing market, and it is unlikely that there will be a 
repeat of the higher income classes moving out from the city centres. 
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In the Vienna suburban area the problem of ageing mainly affects ‘the first generation 
of suburbanised settlements’. In inner city areas the concentration of people over the age 
of 60 is greater, while the proportion of younger age groups in the suburbs is significantly 
higher. In the first generation of suburbanised settlements parents who were young when 
they moved out in the 1970s and 1980s will slowly reach retirement age. This is another 
reason why the authors ask: ‘The question is how these communities will deal with the 
“collective ageing” of the original suburbanites. What will become of the many single-
family homes when the children have moved away or when the “founding fathers and 
mothers” themselves are no longer alive? Likewise, how will the infrastructure adapt to 
the ageing society and who will assume the financial costs thereof? In particular the 
questions of caring for the elderly as well as retooling public institutions to cater for less 
mobile inhabitants will have to be answered satisfactorily’ (Görgl et al. 2011, pp. 16–17). 
The Hungarian case study reveals the different trend of ageing in the developed and 
the undeveloped urban neighbourhoods. It points out that, apart from Budapest where 
ageing is higher than the national average, the phenomenon of ageing mainly affects 
settlements with less favourable environmental and infrastructural conditions. However, 
the population of the developed urban areas is younger as there is an inflow of young, 
active, well-qualified families. This may also be due to the belated, ‘catching up’ 
character of Hungarian suburbanisation processes. Possibly this is because the processes 
which formed the younger demographic structure of the first generation suburbs in 
developed European and Canadian metropolises are occurring in Hungary right now. 
Urban and suburban dichotomies 
Among the early and modern criticisms of urban sprawl several authors have warned of 
the threats of the disappearing compact city and the evolution of the fragmented city. In 
my view this problem is less relevant in the context of the modern European metropolitan 
spatial structure. This is because we can no longer speak of exclusive compact cities. In 
modern regional systems compact and disperse settlements and settlement groups exist 
simultaneously. The former consist of communities developed in a more concentrated 
manner and characterised by a densely built environment in a social sense which have 
transparent if not integrated community systems. The latter, on the other hand, can be 
characterised by developing in a more decentralised, horizontal way, with a family house 
environment and low population density, consisting of sub-groups in a social sense with 
more fragmented communities. 
The Hungarian case study investigated the lack of clear models, which it confirmed. 
Different models exist side by side, complementing each other and showing how many 
other social and business relationships exist within the regional system examined. 
Furthermore, these relationships are formed within the structures of space ‘consumed by’ 
the everyday activities of social status groups of different spatial position (Szirmai et al. 
2011). The Danish case study provided other kinds of evidence by presenting how spatial 
relationships are formed between the city and the agglomeration as well as spatial 
relationships that go beyond these (often crossing national borders), the cooperation 
systems established with various cities, and the big spatial axes of today’s modern 
lifestyle (Reeh, Zerlag 2011). 
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Compared to the compact or dispersed urban dichotomy, however, I believe that the 
modern hierarchical order of the societies of metropolitan areas is more important and 
socially more problematic. Aspects of this are the re-organised and even strengthening 
spatial social dichotomy, which is a negative side effect of urban sprawl, and the 
antagonisms between urban centres and outskirt areas. 
Traditional and new segregation zones (enclaves) can also be seen in the Paris region. 
On the western edge the concentrations of suburban settlements are inhabited by high 
income, managerial classes, while the south-eastern area is populated by lower status 
settlement groups (Cattan 2011, p. 13). 
The Vienna case study also emphasises the growth of the social separation process 
and its threats. Among the reasons for this is that for residents choosing the suburbs of 
Vienna, mainly to the south of the city, not only is easy accessibility essential, i.e. that 
the village should be close to the city centre, but so are land prices, that is to say the 
prices should be high enough to ensure a neighbourhood with people of similar social 
status and income (Görgl et al., p. 6). 
A typical realisation of sociological rules is illustrated by the similar hierarchical 
arrangement of the different educational groups in the Hungarian and French capital 
cities. In the Paris Metropolitan Area (see Figure 6), the farther we go out from the 
regional centre (from the municipality of Paris) towards outer zones, the lower the ratio 
of people with tertiary education, and the higher the ratio of classes with average and 
poor education. The social structure of Budapest (and even of other Hungarian cities) 
also shows this hierarchical arrangement. In central areas the presence of higher social 
status is stronger (better educated, higher income groups with higher positions), while in 
outer districts and outskirt areas the ratio of lower social status (lower educated, lower 
income groups with lower positions) is more characteristic. 
Conclusions: differences and/or similarities? 
The case studies and their related literature state that the phenomena of European 
metropolitan areas are formed by urbanisation processes resulting from historical 
contexts and global trends. By this they prove that the historical roads or even the stages 
of urbanisation cannot really be bypassed, and less developed countries follow the paths 
designated or taken by those ahead of them due to the enforcement of the rules of global 
urbanisation. Moreover, these rules can sometimes override the objectives and the effects 
of conscious state-initiated regional and local development interventions. In the absence 
of this aspect, it would be hard to explain the European and Hungarian suburban social 
similarities, and the dichotomies between high and low social status settlements, which 
developed in different social and historical contexts in different economic conditions and 
by the activities of actors shaping different processes. 
Global trends can also be explained by other processes causing convergence, namely 
the decreasing role of the state and authorities in regional development across Europe, the 
growing influence of market forces and the interest groups involved in market 
mechanisms. This convergence (on the basis of a relatively strong abstraction) was 
perceptible even in the state-socialist period as the state’s decreasing role in regional 
development correlates with the crisis of the socialist type of welfare state, with the 
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strengthening of local economic and political forces, and with the emergence of limited, 
state-controlled yet rising market forces. 
The phenomenon of urban sprawl has been detected in all the investigated 
metropolitan areas in the stage of relative deconcentration. This has been explained by 
Enyedi (according to the Dutch school) as a process of suburbanisation, yet it is also clear 
that there is more to this case, since the process of re-urbanisation can also be felt here. 
The fact is that the suburbanisation process is accompanied by the phenomena of 
gentrification and they are complementary, parallel great mechanisms. Due to the 
absence of comprehensive studies, I cannot comment on the big questions raised by 
Enyedi, namely whether the return to city centres is merely a rearrangement of the 
population in urban agglomerations or whether it is a new stage of urban growth? The 
case studies presented here, however, clearly show that the population in urban centres 
(particularly in some inner city neighbourhoods) has tended to grow in recent years. 
There were several reasons for this: moving back, other regional social processes of 
concentration, and the increasing sense of well-being of the metropolitan middle classes 
in the renewed inner district, hence their disinclination to leave. Another contributing 
factor is certainly the fact that quite a few suburban residents are disappointed with the 
suburban way of life. 
This disappointment can be explained by several reasons, including the adverse 
environmental and social impacts of urban sprawl, and the dependencies and 
inconveniencies of a commuting lifestyle. The development of segregation patterns is 
particularly relevant because the reasons mentioned indicate a problem, but not 
necessarily from a scientific viewpoint. Although segregation is usually regarded as 
harmful, separation from other positioned groups and isolation from social problems is a 
common expectation of the suburban middle classes. Naturally, they do not always 
achieve this despite the well-structured and spreading gated communities, as the urban 
poor are also located in the periphery of the metropolitan areas. These different 
residential groups, which have historically competed with each other for ‘elbow room’  in 
different ways and to varying degrees, supersede those in different situations or attract 
those in a similar situation.  
Other reasons for the disappointment are related to market price mechanisms and to 
the fact that decisions on market development serve several people’s interests but not the 
local interests. A certain part of the population, which in post-socialist countries is the 
majority, cannot always afford and do not always want to pay for the costs of the 
infrastructure accompanying suburban development, for instance those of the road 
network or public transport, which neither the state nor the local government can afford 
or intends to pay. 
However, the social significance of the suburban way of life cannot be questioned and 
the demand for individual family housing will continue to be significant (perhaps this is 
most apparent in the Danish case). Today there are still quite a few people intending, or 
at least desiring, to move out of the cities, undoubtedly because of the existing social and 
environmental values of living there and because suburban life is still attractive for them 
despite the fact that it shows symptoms of crisis. The current economic crisis (for 
example, the home loan debt in Hungary) will seriously restrict demand for 
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suburbanisation, and the case of Budapest shows that relocation efforts have considerably 
decreased over the last few years.   
Predicting the future processes of suburbanisation is not easy, not only because of the 
simultaneity of conflicting trends, that is to say that the effects of re-urbanisation are 
emerging during suburbanisation, but also because of the appearance of other major 
European processes. It must be remembered that the European (including the Hungarian) 
population is not only decreasing but at the same time European society is ageing, and 
the ageing phenomenon (especially of those in disadvantaged social positions) is a further 
factor limiting spatial migrations. Thus, today there is more uncertainty than clarity. But 
this might not matter, because if everything could be taken for sure, who would need 
science? 
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Abstract 
During the 20th century, profound socio-economic changes typified the metropolitan regions of the World. One 
of the most outstanding alterations was the relative decentralisation of urban space, that’s visible sign is urban 
sprawl. The following paper intends to introduce the most significant characteristics of this specific 
phenomenon.  
Current urban processes are presented throughout both Northern American and European metropolitan 
regions, with special emphasis on the similarities and differences, by the help of adequate European examples 
(Paris, Vienna, Copenhagen, Budapest). 
The research is aiming to give multilateral information on suburbanisation and gentrification, moreover the 
recentralisation or/and decentralisation of metropolitan areas. 
A vaste introduction can be found in connection with the Hungarian urban planning system and procedures, 
especially during the Socialist Era and the Post-Socialist Period. The results of a deep research on the suburbia, 
suburban societies, the economic welfare of agglomeration settlements are presented concerning the Budapest 
Metropolitan Region, furthermore the recent effects of the world financial crisis that substantially determined. 
